1 00:00:00,500 --> 00:00:01,668 GPWS: Pull up. 2 00:00:01,668 --> 00:00:05,214 FO. HAYES: I remember a very hard impact. 3 00:00:05,214 --> 00:00:06,256 We hit the ground. 4 00:00:06,256 --> 00:00:07,382 NARRATOR: A commuter flight slams 5 00:00:07,382 --> 00:00:10,219 into a North Carolina neighborhood. 6 00:00:10,219 --> 00:00:11,637 FO. HAYES: What has just happened to us? 7 00:00:11,637 --> 00:00:13,472 NARRATOR: Thirty-seven souls are lost, 8 00:00:13,472 --> 00:00:16,141 but the crew survives to explain what happened. 9 00:00:16,141 --> 00:00:19,102 FO. HAYES: The problem was the weather. 10 00:00:19,102 --> 00:00:21,772 GREG: All of a sudden they ran into this rain shaft. 11 00:00:21,772 --> 00:00:23,607 NARRATOR: But for investigators, weather alone 12 00:00:23,607 --> 00:00:26,443 can't explain the deadly impact. 13 00:00:26,443 --> 00:00:28,612 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Rain did not cause this crash. 14 00:00:28,612 --> 00:00:29,613 FO. HAYES: Flaps to 15. 15 00:00:29,613 --> 00:00:32,282 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down. 16 00:00:32,282 --> 00:00:33,867 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Wait. Stop the tape. 17 00:00:33,867 --> 00:00:37,871 Did he just say push it down? Play it again. 18 00:00:37,871 --> 00:00:40,332 GREG: We replayed that a dozen times. 19 00:00:40,332 --> 00:00:42,751 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down. 20 00:00:42,751 --> 00:00:48,173 GREG: Did he really say that? And what did he mean by that? 21 00:01:05,732 --> 00:01:18,745 ♪ ♪ 22 00:01:18,745 --> 00:01:20,956 NARRATOR: US Air Flight 1016 is en route 23 00:01:20,956 --> 00:01:26,712 from Columbia, South Carolina, to Charlotte, North Carolina. 24 00:01:26,712 --> 00:01:29,006 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, good evening. 25 00:01:29,006 --> 00:01:31,758 Climb and maintain one two thousand. Twelve. 26 00:01:31,758 --> 00:01:34,594 CAPT. GREENLEE: One two thousand, US Air 1016. 27 00:01:34,594 --> 00:01:38,015 NARRATOR: Captain Mike Greenlee is one of US Air's top pilots. 28 00:01:38,015 --> 00:01:39,766 He's an Air Force veteran who still flies 29 00:01:39,766 --> 00:01:42,352 fighter jets in the reserves. 30 00:01:42,352 --> 00:01:46,273 FO. HAYES: I believe he flew the F-4, and then he flew the F-16. 31 00:01:46,273 --> 00:01:49,026 CAPT. GREENLEE: One two thousand. 32 00:01:49,026 --> 00:01:50,902 FO. HAYES: Ten. 33 00:01:50,902 --> 00:01:53,655 NARRATOR: The first officer, Phil Hayes, is a seasoned pilot 34 00:01:53,655 --> 00:01:56,658 who's dreamed of flying since he was a boy. 35 00:01:56,658 --> 00:01:58,327 FO. HAYES: And I went for a ride in an airplane 36 00:01:58,327 --> 00:02:02,622 when I was about fifteen and... fourteen or fifteen, 37 00:02:02,622 --> 00:02:07,294 and the bug bit, and I wanted to fly after that. 38 00:02:07,294 --> 00:02:09,921 FO. HAYES: So, how old are you, Mike? 39 00:02:09,921 --> 00:02:13,175 CAPT. GREENLEE: Thirty-eight. How about yourself? 40 00:02:13,175 --> 00:02:16,470 FO. HAYES: I'll be 42 on the 26th of July. 41 00:02:16,470 --> 00:02:20,474 CAPT. GREENLEE: Is that right? I had you figured about 35. 42 00:02:20,474 --> 00:02:22,351 FO. HAYES: Did you really? CAPT. GREENLEE: Oh yeah. 43 00:02:22,351 --> 00:02:24,478 FO. HAYES: I knew there was something 44 00:02:24,478 --> 00:02:26,104 I liked about you. 45 00:02:26,104 --> 00:02:27,481 NARRATOR: This is the first time 46 00:02:27,481 --> 00:02:29,775 the two pilots have flown together. 47 00:02:29,775 --> 00:02:34,196 FO. HAYES: Mike was a very affable, very likeable fella, 48 00:02:34,196 --> 00:02:36,740 and we hit it off right away. 49 00:02:36,740 --> 00:02:42,496 ♪ ♪ 50 00:02:42,496 --> 00:02:43,872 NARRATOR: Many of the fifty-two passengers 51 00:02:43,872 --> 00:02:49,211 are traveling for summer holidays. 52 00:02:49,211 --> 00:02:52,547 RICHARD: This was a Saturday prior to July 4th, 53 00:02:52,547 --> 00:02:55,634 so there were a lot of leisure travelers. 54 00:02:55,634 --> 00:02:58,845 RICHARD: Can I offer you a snack? 55 00:02:58,845 --> 00:03:01,139 NARRATOR: Flight attendant Richard DeMary has been on the job 56 00:03:01,139 --> 00:03:04,101 for two years. He enjoys his work so much 57 00:03:04,101 --> 00:03:08,563 that he looks for ways to get more hours. 58 00:03:08,563 --> 00:03:12,150 RICHARD: I picked up this flight as part of a series of flights 59 00:03:12,150 --> 00:03:13,819 over a number of days. 60 00:03:13,819 --> 00:03:20,117 It was a three-day trip with multiple legs each day. 61 00:03:20,117 --> 00:03:23,328 NARRATOR: Today's flight to Charlotte is on board a DC-9, 62 00:03:23,328 --> 00:03:28,041 one of the many aircraft types Greenlee and Hayes have flown. 63 00:03:28,041 --> 00:03:29,960 CAPT. GREENLEE: What kind of airplanes you fly corporate? 64 00:03:29,960 --> 00:03:34,923 FO. HAYES: A few Lear, Cessna Citation, King Air Beechcraft. 65 00:03:34,923 --> 00:03:36,174 CAPT. GREENLEE: Oh, that's nice equipment. 66 00:03:36,174 --> 00:03:37,968 FO. HAYES: Yeah, yeah, pretty nice. 67 00:03:37,968 --> 00:03:39,970 RICHARD: Flight crews at US Air typically 68 00:03:39,970 --> 00:03:42,305 were always very professional. 69 00:03:42,305 --> 00:03:45,183 FO. HAYES: And a lot of piston bangers, Navajos and that stuff. 70 00:03:45,183 --> 00:03:51,273 CAPT. GREENLEE: Yeah? I got a lot of time in Navajos, Aztecs, Senecas. 71 00:03:51,273 --> 00:03:53,483 RICHARD: With that, there was a lot of trust in the individuals 72 00:03:53,483 --> 00:03:55,026 that you were working with, both from 73 00:03:55,026 --> 00:03:59,281 a flight attendant perspective as well as the pilots. 74 00:03:59,281 --> 00:04:04,202 NARRATOR: The US Air crew is on its fourth leg of the day. 75 00:04:04,202 --> 00:04:07,372 They started out this morning in Pittsburgh, 76 00:04:07,372 --> 00:04:13,670 flew to New York City, then Charlotte and on to Columbia. 77 00:04:13,670 --> 00:04:17,674 Now, they're on their way back to Charlotte. 78 00:04:17,674 --> 00:04:20,969 FO. HAYES: There was no weather. There were no thunderstorms. 79 00:04:20,969 --> 00:04:23,221 There was, there was nothing. 80 00:04:23,221 --> 00:04:31,521 It was a completely benign, beautiful summertime day. 81 00:04:31,521 --> 00:04:37,694 NARRATOR: The DC-9 is now roughly fifteen minutes from landing. 82 00:04:37,694 --> 00:04:40,322 CAPT. GREENLEE: Ladies and gentlemen, we're 40 miles from Charlotte. 83 00:04:40,322 --> 00:04:42,199 At this time we'd like to ask the flight attendants 84 00:04:42,199 --> 00:04:46,953 to secure the cabin for arrival. 85 00:04:46,953 --> 00:04:50,123 RICHARD: Here, let me clear this away for you. 86 00:04:50,123 --> 00:04:55,795 RICHARD: The flight between Columbia and Charlotte was normal. 87 00:04:55,795 --> 00:04:59,424 It was short. Even though it was a 50 minute flight, 88 00:04:59,424 --> 00:05:02,719 the actual flight time was much less than that. 89 00:05:02,719 --> 00:05:04,471 NARRATOR: As they approach the airport, 90 00:05:04,471 --> 00:05:09,142 the skies begin to darken. 91 00:05:09,142 --> 00:05:12,604 FO. HAYES: There's more rain out there than I thought there was. 92 00:05:12,604 --> 00:05:15,398 FO. HAYES: We could see one little... what we refer to 93 00:05:15,398 --> 00:05:18,401 in the aviation business as a build-up. 94 00:05:18,401 --> 00:05:20,403 It has a little rain in it. 95 00:05:20,403 --> 00:05:25,367 But it's not anything to be concerned about. 96 00:05:25,367 --> 00:05:27,953 It's just a little shower. 97 00:05:27,953 --> 00:05:32,457 Mike reached over and turned the radar on. 98 00:05:32,457 --> 00:05:34,084 CAPT. GREENLEE: It looks like it's sitting 99 00:05:34,084 --> 00:05:35,544 just off the edge of the airport. 100 00:05:35,544 --> 00:05:39,798 NARRATOR: The radar shows some rain directly ahead. 101 00:05:39,798 --> 00:05:42,634 CAPT. GREENLEE: Charlotte, US Air 1016. 102 00:05:42,634 --> 00:05:44,427 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, go ahead. 103 00:05:44,427 --> 00:05:46,638 CAPT. GREENLEE: We're showing a little build-up here. 104 00:05:46,638 --> 00:05:50,475 It looks like it's sitting on the radial. 105 00:05:50,475 --> 00:05:53,270 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: About how far ahead are you looking, 1016? 106 00:05:53,270 --> 00:05:55,146 CAPT. GREENLEE: About 15 miles. 107 00:05:55,146 --> 00:05:57,357 NARRATOR: The controller explains that he'll be directing them 108 00:05:57,357 --> 00:05:59,859 away from the rain shower. 109 00:05:59,859 --> 00:06:02,487 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I'll turn you just before you get there 110 00:06:02,487 --> 00:06:05,240 about five miles northbound. 111 00:06:05,240 --> 00:06:11,246 CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay. FO. HAYES: Good call. 112 00:06:11,246 --> 00:06:14,082 NARRATOR: US Air Flight 1016 is now less than ten minutes 113 00:06:14,082 --> 00:06:17,919 from its destination. 114 00:06:17,919 --> 00:06:21,339 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, Charlotte. Maintain 4,000. 115 00:06:21,339 --> 00:06:23,550 Runway one-eight-right. 116 00:06:23,550 --> 00:06:25,552 CAPT. GREENLEE: 4,000 for the right side. 117 00:06:25,552 --> 00:06:30,890 FO. HAYES: That's one-eleven and three and one-eighty-one. 118 00:06:30,890 --> 00:06:33,518 NARRATOR: The pilots are ready for final approach. 119 00:06:33,518 --> 00:06:37,105 CAPT. GREENLEE: The cabin's down. Seat belt signs on. 120 00:06:37,105 --> 00:06:38,481 Hydraulics on. 121 00:06:38,481 --> 00:06:44,362 Altimeters, flight instruments thirty-oh-one, set. 122 00:06:44,362 --> 00:06:45,572 FO. HAYES: Set. 123 00:06:45,572 --> 00:06:48,575 NARRATOR: As promised, the controller turns Flight 1016 124 00:06:48,575 --> 00:06:50,243 away from the storm. 125 00:06:50,243 --> 00:06:52,579 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, turn ten degrees right, 126 00:06:52,579 --> 00:06:54,497 descend and maintain 2,300. 127 00:06:54,497 --> 00:06:57,292 Vectors to visual approach to one-eight-right. 128 00:06:57,292 --> 00:07:01,379 FO. HAYES: The controller said descend to 2,300 feet. 129 00:07:01,379 --> 00:07:04,507 He said, I'll turn you at the marker for the visual approach. 130 00:07:04,507 --> 00:07:09,387 CAPT. GREENLEE: Ten right. Down 2,300, US Air 1016. 131 00:07:09,387 --> 00:07:11,139 FO. HAYES: Another confirmation that there was 132 00:07:11,139 --> 00:07:15,518 absolutely nothing going on. 133 00:07:15,518 --> 00:07:18,438 RICHARD: At that point in the landing phase, 134 00:07:18,438 --> 00:07:19,648 the cabin had been secured 135 00:07:19,648 --> 00:07:22,567 and we were in our seats ready for landing. 136 00:07:22,567 --> 00:07:33,000 ♪ ♪ 137 00:07:33,000 --> 00:07:34,590 FO. HAYES: Gear down. 138 00:07:41,010 --> 00:07:46,100 Flaps 40, please. 139 00:07:46,100 --> 00:07:52,020 CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps. FO. HAYES: Ugh. 140 00:07:52,020 --> 00:07:56,820 FO. HAYES: Suddenly this very heavy rain seemed to come from nowhere. 141 00:07:56,820 --> 00:07:59,240 It did not go light rain, moderate rain, 142 00:07:59,240 --> 00:08:01,700 heavy rain, extreme. It didn't do that. 143 00:08:01,700 --> 00:08:05,160 It was just all of a sudden like you're in... under a waterfall. 144 00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:10,290 CAPT. GREENLEE: Here come the wipers. 145 00:08:10,290 --> 00:08:14,130 FO. HAYES: That's, 10 knots right there. 146 00:08:14,130 --> 00:08:16,130 FO. HAYES: Now we're like, oh. What has happened? 147 00:08:16,130 --> 00:08:20,050 You know, what changed? 148 00:08:20,050 --> 00:08:24,800 RICHARD: In other rain events you can see out the window. 149 00:08:24,800 --> 00:08:28,140 You can make things out. 150 00:08:28,140 --> 00:08:33,100 This rain completely obstructed any view out of the window. 151 00:08:33,100 --> 00:08:34,310 FO. HAYES: Whoa! 152 00:08:34,310 --> 00:08:36,150 CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay, you're plus twenty. 153 00:08:36,150 --> 00:08:39,280 FO. HAYES: Visibility had been reduced, and with this heavy rain, 154 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:44,110 Mike and I made the same decision at about the same time. 155 00:08:44,110 --> 00:08:45,870 Let's go around. 156 00:08:45,870 --> 00:08:47,870 CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it around. Go to the right. 157 00:08:47,870 --> 00:08:54,210 FO. HAYES: Let's play it safe. So I reached up 158 00:08:54,210 --> 00:08:57,290 and pushed the power up, started a right turn, 159 00:08:57,290 --> 00:09:02,170 and at this point Mike picked up the microphone and he said... 160 00:09:02,170 --> 00:09:04,340 CAPT. GREENLEE: US Air 1016's on the go. 161 00:09:04,340 --> 00:09:10,850 ♪ ♪ 162 00:09:10,850 --> 00:09:13,140 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, I understand you're on the go, sir. 163 00:09:13,140 --> 00:09:17,440 Fly runway heading, climb and maintain 3,000. 164 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,280 NARRATOR: It's what pilots call a missed approach. 165 00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:24,030 RICHARD: You have the noise of the engines. 166 00:09:24,030 --> 00:09:29,240 You have the feeling on your body that you're climbing. 167 00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:32,290 Go-arounds are not that unusual. 168 00:09:32,290 --> 00:09:36,290 I've been in go-arounds before. 169 00:09:36,290 --> 00:09:39,090 NARRATOR: But this is not a normal go-around. 170 00:09:39,090 --> 00:09:42,510 GPWS: Pull up. Terrain! Terrain! 171 00:09:42,510 --> 00:09:45,050 FO. HAYES: All of a sudden the aircraft wasn't flying anymore. 172 00:09:45,050 --> 00:09:46,300 It was just falling. 173 00:09:46,300 --> 00:09:49,350 And we were losing airspeed very, very rapidly. 174 00:09:49,350 --> 00:09:52,020 GPWS: Terrain! Terrain! 175 00:09:52,020 --> 00:09:59,190 RICHARD: It was very alarming. This was not part of a go-around. 176 00:09:59,190 --> 00:10:01,230 CAPT. GREENLEE: Ugh. Firewall power. 177 00:10:01,230 --> 00:10:07,110 NARRATOR: Phil Hayes jams the throttles to maximum. 178 00:10:07,110 --> 00:10:12,240 RICHARD: We're sinking, and I'm preparing myself. 179 00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:16,080 ♪ ♪ 180 00:10:16,080 --> 00:10:18,130 FO. HAYES: I remember the stick shaker, 181 00:10:18,130 --> 00:10:21,000 and I remember the ground proximity warning system go off. 182 00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:22,380 It said, pull up. Pull up. 183 00:10:22,380 --> 00:10:26,010 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. 184 00:10:26,010 --> 00:10:29,220 ♪ ♪ 185 00:10:29,220 --> 00:10:31,600 FO. HAYES: And then I remember a very hard impact. 186 00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:35,270 And we hit the ground. 187 00:10:43,980 --> 00:10:46,190 RICHARD: We were sliding along the ground, 188 00:10:46,190 --> 00:10:49,360 and I started hearing the snapping of trees. 189 00:10:57,160 --> 00:10:59,500 FO. HAYES: And the left wing sheared off. 190 00:11:04,380 --> 00:11:08,260 And the cockpit came to rest in the middle of a road. 191 00:11:11,050 --> 00:11:20,270 ♪ ♪ 192 00:11:20,270 --> 00:11:24,440 NARRATOR: US Air Flight 1016 destined for Charlotte, North Carolina, 193 00:11:24,440 --> 00:11:31,370 has slammed into the ground less than a mile from the airport. 194 00:11:31,370 --> 00:11:36,040 Fight attendant Richard DeMary has no idea how he survived. 195 00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:40,250 RICHARD: There was a tremendous amount of disbelief 196 00:11:40,250 --> 00:11:48,300 and disorientation, 197 00:11:48,300 --> 00:11:51,470 and it took a few seconds to get my bearings. 198 00:11:51,470 --> 00:11:58,310 And I should say that I was scared. 199 00:11:58,310 --> 00:12:01,310 You know, there was a lot of fear 200 00:12:01,310 --> 00:12:06,820 because of the smoke and the heat coming off of the airplane. 201 00:12:06,820 --> 00:12:12,490 And I remember the real thought of, I've survived the accident. 202 00:12:12,490 --> 00:12:19,410 I don't wanna die afterwards. 203 00:12:19,410 --> 00:12:24,170 NARRATOR: First Officer Phil Hayes has also survived the crash. 204 00:12:24,170 --> 00:12:26,840 FO. HAYES: I remember looking to my left, 205 00:12:26,840 --> 00:12:31,430 and there was nobody in the captain's seat. 206 00:12:31,430 --> 00:12:34,590 And in my mind I know I was trying to put things together, 207 00:12:34,590 --> 00:12:38,850 like, what has just happened to us? 208 00:12:38,850 --> 00:12:44,350 And so I got out of my harness and crawled out of the opening, 209 00:12:44,350 --> 00:12:47,610 and I found Captain Mike Greenlee tending 210 00:12:47,610 --> 00:12:53,820 to one of the flight attendants who had been injured. 211 00:12:53,820 --> 00:12:55,370 RICHARD: You know, the full realization 212 00:12:55,370 --> 00:12:58,660 that we had been in an accident hit home. 213 00:12:58,660 --> 00:13:01,580 So I thought, I gotta do something to help. 214 00:13:01,580 --> 00:13:06,670 So I start to yell, release seat belts and get out. 215 00:13:06,670 --> 00:13:13,630 Release seat belts and get out. Release seat belts and get out. 216 00:13:15,470 --> 00:13:16,760 NEWS ANCHOR (Archive): Good evening. 217 00:13:16,760 --> 00:13:18,430 Emergency workers in Charlotte, North Carolina, 218 00:13:18,430 --> 00:13:20,810 spent this Sunday pulling bodies from the wreckage 219 00:13:20,810 --> 00:13:24,940 of a US Air jet that crashed there last night. 220 00:13:24,940 --> 00:13:27,900 NARRATOR: The crash of Flight 1016 is the first accident 221 00:13:27,900 --> 00:13:36,410 involving a major airline in North Carolina in twenty years. 222 00:13:36,410 --> 00:13:39,530 Both pilots and the cabin crew have survived. 223 00:13:39,530 --> 00:13:42,700 But of the fifty-two passengers, thirty-seven are dead. 224 00:13:42,700 --> 00:13:49,540 ♪ ♪ 225 00:13:49,540 --> 00:13:51,630 FO. HAYES: As I looked back at the wreckage, 226 00:13:51,630 --> 00:13:54,840 it was just very surreal. 227 00:13:54,840 --> 00:13:59,930 How could this have happened to us when the day was so benign? 228 00:13:59,930 --> 00:14:04,640 There was no weather. There was no threat. 229 00:14:04,640 --> 00:14:07,520 How could this have happened? 230 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:09,520 NARRATOR: Greg Feith, senior investigator 231 00:14:09,520 --> 00:14:11,530 with the National Transportation Safety Board, 232 00:14:11,530 --> 00:14:14,610 will lead the investigation. 233 00:14:14,610 --> 00:14:17,110 GREG: Any time you go to an airplane accident site, 234 00:14:17,110 --> 00:14:20,410 a crash site, there's always this wave of emotion. 235 00:14:20,410 --> 00:14:23,580 I don't care how seasoned an investigator you are, 236 00:14:23,580 --> 00:14:26,160 because you know that people have been seriously injured 237 00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:29,960 or killed in that particular event. 238 00:14:29,960 --> 00:14:31,550 And so as the investigator in charge, 239 00:14:31,550 --> 00:14:34,050 you have to compartmentalize that, because you can't 240 00:14:34,050 --> 00:14:38,840 get emotionally attached and still be able to do your job. 241 00:14:38,840 --> 00:14:41,760 NARRATOR: Examining the wreckage is the team's first task. 242 00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:43,770 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So what have we got? 243 00:14:43,770 --> 00:14:46,100 NARRATOR: They must determine if a loss of engine power 244 00:14:46,100 --> 00:14:48,520 was a factor in the crash. 245 00:14:48,520 --> 00:14:52,860 They examine the DC-9's two Pratt andamp; Whitney power plants. 246 00:14:52,860 --> 00:14:54,730 GREG: There are a variety of things that 247 00:14:54,730 --> 00:14:57,570 these power plant experts are gonna be looking for 248 00:14:57,570 --> 00:15:00,660 to determine if in fact there was some sort of 249 00:15:00,660 --> 00:15:04,200 operational issue, mechanical malfunction or failure 250 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:06,830 with the engine or engines. 251 00:15:06,830 --> 00:15:11,630 NARRATOR: Right away, they spot something unexpected. 252 00:15:11,630 --> 00:15:14,460 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that. 253 00:15:14,460 --> 00:15:18,880 The thrust reverser on this engine is deployed. 254 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:22,100 GREG: Their examination of the right engine indicated that 255 00:15:22,100 --> 00:15:25,720 the thrust reverser was in the deployed position 256 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:28,890 and that the thrust reverser on the left engine 257 00:15:28,890 --> 00:15:30,850 was in the stowed position, 258 00:15:30,850 --> 00:15:34,570 and of course that always starts the red flag up the pole, 259 00:15:34,570 --> 00:15:36,190 if you will, going, hmm. 260 00:15:36,190 --> 00:15:39,030 Why is this one not in the same position as the other? 261 00:15:39,030 --> 00:15:42,620 Because they should be symmetrical. 262 00:15:42,620 --> 00:15:44,660 NARRATOR: Thrust reversers are deployed upon landing 263 00:15:44,660 --> 00:15:47,620 to help slow the plane down. 264 00:15:47,620 --> 00:15:49,250 They work by redirecting the engines' 265 00:15:49,250 --> 00:15:52,630 high-powered exhaust gasses forward. 266 00:15:52,630 --> 00:15:55,340 GREG: If it happens in flight that's detrimental, because 267 00:15:55,340 --> 00:15:58,340 if it happens on one engine on a multi-engine airplane 268 00:15:58,340 --> 00:16:03,010 you create an asymmetrical thrust situation. 269 00:16:03,010 --> 00:16:07,020 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Maybe that's what brought this flight down. 270 00:16:07,020 --> 00:16:10,440 Like Lauda Air 004. 271 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:13,860 NARRATOR: Three years earlier in Thailand, Lauda Air Flight 4 272 00:16:13,860 --> 00:16:22,240 crashed, killing 223 people. A thrust reverser was to blame. 273 00:16:22,240 --> 00:16:24,370 GREG: We've had thrust reversers deploy in flight 274 00:16:24,370 --> 00:16:27,080 and, depending on the speed of the aircraft, 275 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:31,120 you can literally break that engine right off the aircraft. 276 00:16:31,120 --> 00:16:33,750 NARRATOR: Closer investigation reveals abrasion marks 277 00:16:33,750 --> 00:16:36,880 on the metal of the right side reverser, 278 00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:41,130 marks that suggest a heavy impact with the ground. 279 00:16:41,130 --> 00:16:44,260 It's an important clue. 280 00:16:44,260 --> 00:16:47,890 Further analysis leads to a definitive answer. 281 00:16:47,890 --> 00:16:50,390 Investigators know exactly when and how 282 00:16:50,390 --> 00:16:53,400 the right side reverser opened. 283 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:56,310 GREG: They were able to make a determination that the 284 00:16:56,310 --> 00:17:00,280 reverser on that right engine, even though it was deployed, 285 00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:03,950 happened during the course of the impact sequence 286 00:17:03,950 --> 00:17:06,990 and did not happen in flight. 287 00:17:06,990 --> 00:17:09,950 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: At least we know it wasn't thrust reversers. 288 00:17:09,950 --> 00:17:11,870 NARRATOR: Eliminating one potential cause 289 00:17:11,870 --> 00:17:15,420 is a step forward for investigators. 290 00:17:15,420 --> 00:17:17,210 But they're still a long way from understanding 291 00:17:17,210 --> 00:17:20,840 what brought down US Air Flight 1016. 292 00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:22,260 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Keep looking through this wreckage. 293 00:17:22,260 --> 00:17:29,810 See if you can find any clues. I'm gonna speak with the crew. 294 00:17:29,810 --> 00:17:33,940 NARRATOR: Perhaps the pilots can shed some light on what happened. 295 00:17:33,940 --> 00:17:36,650 GPWS: Pull up. 296 00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:41,650 FO. HAYES: The impact broke my foot and cut my head open, 297 00:17:41,650 --> 00:17:46,280 and so I was in the hospital about three days, I believe, 298 00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:48,660 and when we were released from the hospital 299 00:17:48,660 --> 00:17:53,160 we were taken to a hotel. 300 00:17:53,160 --> 00:17:56,920 NARRATOR: First Officer Phil Hayes meets with the NTSB. 301 00:17:56,920 --> 00:17:59,340 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Thank you so much for seeing us today. 302 00:17:59,340 --> 00:18:02,050 We just have a few questions. This won't take long. 303 00:18:02,050 --> 00:18:07,720 BARRY: We recognize that this is not a pleasant time for them. 304 00:18:07,720 --> 00:18:12,100 They've been through what is most likely the most difficult 305 00:18:12,100 --> 00:18:16,100 professional event they've ever been through. 306 00:18:16,100 --> 00:18:20,440 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: On the day of the crash, can you tell us what happened? 307 00:18:20,440 --> 00:18:22,440 FO. HAYES: The problem was the weather. 308 00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:24,360 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Tell me about the weather. 309 00:18:24,360 --> 00:18:32,240 FO. HAYES: Flaps 40, please. CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps. 310 00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:35,000 ♪ ♪ 311 00:18:35,000 --> 00:18:39,000 GREG: All of a sudden they ran into this rain shaft. 312 00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,750 FO. HAYES: We lost all visibility. 313 00:18:41,750 --> 00:18:43,380 CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it around. Go to the right. 314 00:18:43,380 --> 00:18:45,720 GREG: That's when the captain called for the first officer, 315 00:18:45,720 --> 00:18:48,590 who in this case was the flying pilot at the time, 316 00:18:48,590 --> 00:18:50,140 to execute a go-around. 317 00:18:50,140 --> 00:18:53,560 They were gonna climb to 3,000 feet, roll to the right 318 00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:55,480 to turn right, and of course you're 319 00:18:55,480 --> 00:18:59,190 bringing the power up at the same time. 320 00:18:59,190 --> 00:19:03,480 FO. HAYES: The next thing I knew the aircraft was falling. 321 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:08,570 FO. HAYES: It's a terrible feeling to feel the aircraft fall 322 00:19:08,570 --> 00:19:14,080 and you realize it isn't flying anymore. 323 00:19:14,080 --> 00:19:21,500 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Why did you decide to fly into the storm in the first place? 324 00:19:21,500 --> 00:19:23,500 NARRATOR: Pilots usually avoid thunderstorms 325 00:19:23,500 --> 00:19:25,550 because they can produce violent air currents 326 00:19:25,550 --> 00:19:29,840 that can cause turbulence or even damage the aircraft. 327 00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:32,260 JOHN: You're always respectful of thunderstorms. 328 00:19:32,260 --> 00:19:34,720 The weather there was growing, that was the big thing. 329 00:19:34,720 --> 00:19:36,220 And it was growing quickly. 330 00:19:36,220 --> 00:19:41,360 That's a key indicator that the situation's deteriorating. 331 00:19:41,360 --> 00:19:43,110 FO. HAYES: Well, air traffic control told us 332 00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:45,530 the weather was nothing to worry about. 333 00:19:45,530 --> 00:19:48,110 FO. HAYES: And the controllers really did not 334 00:19:48,110 --> 00:19:51,870 say anything to us about it. 335 00:19:51,870 --> 00:19:54,080 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I'll tell you what, US Air 1016. 336 00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,580 You may get some rain just south of the field. 337 00:19:56,580 --> 00:20:00,290 There might be a little coming off the north. 338 00:20:00,290 --> 00:20:05,000 BARRY: In fact, some rain was misleading. It wasn't some rain. 339 00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:07,670 It was a very heavy thunderstorm. 340 00:20:07,670 --> 00:20:10,300 NARRATOR: Investigators have learned that air traffic control 341 00:20:10,300 --> 00:20:12,930 failed to warn the crew of Flight 1016 342 00:20:12,930 --> 00:20:16,520 that there was a powerful storm in their path. 343 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:18,980 BARRY: They mistakenly believed that it would be 344 00:20:18,980 --> 00:20:22,440 safe for them to land. 345 00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:24,190 NARRATOR: The question now is why? 346 00:20:28,780 --> 00:20:31,950 NARRATOR: Investigators need to understand why air traffic control 347 00:20:31,950 --> 00:20:35,330 in Charlotte didn't warn US Air Flight 1016 348 00:20:35,330 --> 00:20:39,200 about a fierce storm over the airport. 349 00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:41,460 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Oh, hey. Good to meet you. 350 00:20:41,460 --> 00:20:44,170 JOHN: The air traffic controllers had more information, 351 00:20:44,170 --> 00:20:47,170 and they could see and they had been watching this thunderstorm 352 00:20:47,170 --> 00:20:50,170 for much longer than the flight crew had. 353 00:20:50,170 --> 00:20:52,680 So we knew very early on it was gonna be 354 00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:57,060 one of the central areas of focus to understand it. 355 00:20:57,060 --> 00:20:58,270 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Why did you tell the pilots 356 00:20:58,270 --> 00:21:01,310 the weather was good enough to land in? 357 00:21:01,310 --> 00:21:04,860 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The weather reports told us it was. 358 00:21:04,860 --> 00:21:07,480 NARRATOR: The controller reveals that he relied on a bulletin 359 00:21:07,480 --> 00:21:09,860 from the National Weather Service. 360 00:21:09,860 --> 00:21:12,070 It showed that conditions were well within limits 361 00:21:12,070 --> 00:21:14,160 for a safe landing. 362 00:21:14,160 --> 00:21:17,120 JOHN: The reports on the field were light winds. 363 00:21:17,120 --> 00:21:19,870 There had been some rain on and off. 364 00:21:19,870 --> 00:21:22,330 There's nothing to key them to say that 365 00:21:22,330 --> 00:21:24,920 this is an unsafe condition 366 00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:27,090 and that they shouldn't continue to fly it. 367 00:21:27,090 --> 00:21:28,420 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I even asked a pilot 368 00:21:28,420 --> 00:21:30,380 who landed four minutes earlier how it was. 369 00:21:30,380 --> 00:21:33,470 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 983, how was the ride on your final approach? 370 00:21:33,470 --> 00:21:37,050 PILOT: Smooth. US Air 983. 371 00:21:37,050 --> 00:21:41,480 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, previous flight just exited the runway. 372 00:21:41,480 --> 00:21:43,810 He said it was a smooth ride. 373 00:21:43,810 --> 00:21:47,440 ♪ ♪ 374 00:21:47,440 --> 00:21:49,730 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: It was fine, no problems. 375 00:21:49,730 --> 00:21:52,440 BARRY: That's pretty significant in that 376 00:21:52,440 --> 00:21:55,280 all the information that crews have, 377 00:21:55,280 --> 00:21:58,910 real-time information from people flying for their airline, 378 00:21:58,910 --> 00:22:00,700 carries a lot of weight. 379 00:22:00,700 --> 00:22:03,700 NARRATOR: The weather bulletin issued at 6:36 PM 380 00:22:03,700 --> 00:22:10,380 was indeed correct. Conditions were clear to land. 381 00:22:10,380 --> 00:22:13,090 But minutes later, the skies over the airport 382 00:22:13,090 --> 00:22:16,760 opened up and heavy rain poured down. 383 00:22:16,760 --> 00:22:21,430 ♪ ♪ 384 00:22:21,430 --> 00:22:24,810 CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it around. Go to the right. 385 00:22:24,810 --> 00:22:28,770 US Air 1016's on the go. 386 00:22:28,770 --> 00:22:30,770 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, understand you're on the go, sir. 387 00:22:30,770 --> 00:22:34,280 Fly runway heading, climb and maintain 3,000. 388 00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:36,490 NARRATOR: At the same time, the controller acknowledges 389 00:22:36,490 --> 00:22:39,240 the crew's missed approach. 390 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:45,870 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air 1016, understand you're turning right? Go ahead, 1016. 391 00:22:45,870 --> 00:22:48,790 NARRATOR: He never gets a response. 392 00:22:58,220 --> 00:23:02,390 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: By the time I got to the next bulletin, it was too late. 393 00:23:02,390 --> 00:23:04,850 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Listen, I really appreciate your help. 394 00:23:04,850 --> 00:23:06,470 If I have more questions, is it all right 395 00:23:06,470 --> 00:23:07,930 if I call you, all right? 396 00:23:07,930 --> 00:23:08,680 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sure. NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Thanks. 397 00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:09,810 NARRATOR: It's now clear to investigators 398 00:23:09,810 --> 00:23:11,940 that weather conditions at the Charlotte Airport 399 00:23:11,940 --> 00:23:17,860 changed very quickly. 400 00:23:17,860 --> 00:23:20,650 What's unclear is why the controller's weather report 401 00:23:20,650 --> 00:23:23,870 failed to forecast the change. 402 00:23:23,870 --> 00:23:26,870 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's see what we have here. 403 00:23:26,870 --> 00:23:28,870 NARRATOR: They study the reports that the National Weather Service 404 00:23:28,870 --> 00:23:35,790 issued for Charlotte Airport that day. 405 00:23:35,790 --> 00:23:48,680 6:36 PM. Light rain showers. 6:40 PM. Heavy rain showers. 406 00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:50,940 It seems the weather service correctly identified 407 00:23:50,940 --> 00:23:52,850 the change in conditions. 408 00:23:52,850 --> 00:23:56,730 But then investigators make an important discovery. 409 00:23:56,730 --> 00:23:58,320 It took two minutes for the weather service 410 00:23:58,320 --> 00:24:02,860 to transmit the new information in an updated bulletin. 411 00:24:02,860 --> 00:24:05,910 GREG: The problem came from the air traffic controllers 412 00:24:05,910 --> 00:24:09,660 not having a full body of information 413 00:24:09,660 --> 00:24:11,870 from the National Weather Service. 414 00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:18,590 FO. HAYES: Flaps 40, please. 415 00:24:18,590 --> 00:24:21,920 GREG: So they weren't providing real-time information 416 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:23,930 to the flight crew. 417 00:24:23,930 --> 00:24:29,600 CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps. 418 00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:33,730 GREG: They were very delayed in providing essential information 419 00:24:33,730 --> 00:24:36,650 that would have assisted this crew in their decision-making 420 00:24:36,650 --> 00:24:39,650 as they progressed towards the airport. 421 00:24:39,650 --> 00:24:44,450 NARRATOR: Weather radar images soon lead to another discovery. 422 00:24:44,450 --> 00:24:46,910 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: This is crazy. Look at that. 423 00:24:46,910 --> 00:24:49,580 There are two storm cells moving in here. 424 00:24:49,580 --> 00:24:54,040 As the US Air pilots were trying to avoid one storm formation... 425 00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:55,750 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: 18:40. 426 00:24:55,750 --> 00:24:58,630 NARRATOR: Another storm cell... NTSB INVESTIGATOR: 18:42. 427 00:24:58,630 --> 00:25:00,590 NARRATOR: ... suddenly increased in intensity. 428 00:25:00,590 --> 00:25:02,670 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: They were blindsided. 429 00:25:02,670 --> 00:25:03,880 CAPT. GREENLEE: Here come the wipers. 430 00:25:03,880 --> 00:25:05,760 NARRATOR: The late weather report left the crew 431 00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:09,970 unprepared for the sudden downpour. 432 00:25:09,970 --> 00:25:13,230 The critical question now: Was the rainstorm strong enough 433 00:25:13,230 --> 00:25:17,560 to knock Flight 1016 out of the sky? 434 00:25:17,560 --> 00:25:20,770 GREG: We had to look at that to see if in fact 435 00:25:20,770 --> 00:25:23,190 this heavy rain shower had any kind of cause 436 00:25:23,190 --> 00:25:27,740 or contributing factor in this accident. 437 00:25:27,740 --> 00:25:30,950 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: NASA has studied this. 438 00:25:30,950 --> 00:25:33,200 NARRATOR: Investigators review NASA research 439 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:37,290 that shows heavy rain can stick to a wing, increasing drag 440 00:25:37,290 --> 00:25:42,000 and increasing the chance of an aerodynamic stall. 441 00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,760 GREG: If the volume of rain striking the aircraft 442 00:25:44,760 --> 00:25:47,260 is sufficient, it will disrupt the smooth airflow and 443 00:25:47,260 --> 00:25:53,930 decrease the efficiency, the lifting capability of the wing. 444 00:25:53,930 --> 00:25:56,100 NARRATOR: Testing has shown that the amount of rain needed 445 00:25:56,100 --> 00:25:59,310 to stall a wing and cause a crash is huge -- 446 00:25:59,310 --> 00:26:07,030 thirty to forty inches per hour. 447 00:26:07,030 --> 00:26:08,990 Investigators examine precipitation data 448 00:26:08,990 --> 00:26:10,910 from the day of the crash. 449 00:26:10,910 --> 00:26:16,120 They want to know just how bad the rain really was. 450 00:26:16,120 --> 00:26:18,120 What they find is surprising. 451 00:26:18,120 --> 00:26:20,130 The rate of precipitation during the downpour 452 00:26:20,130 --> 00:26:23,050 was only ten inches per hour. 453 00:26:23,050 --> 00:26:25,710 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Not enough to bring the plane down. 454 00:26:25,710 --> 00:26:27,300 GREG: We were able to determine that there was 455 00:26:27,300 --> 00:26:31,220 a negligible effect of this heavy rain shower 456 00:26:31,220 --> 00:26:34,390 on the performance of the airplane. 457 00:26:34,390 --> 00:26:39,940 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Rain did not cause this crash. 458 00:26:39,940 --> 00:26:42,060 NARRATOR: If it wasn't the sudden downpour that caused 459 00:26:42,060 --> 00:26:47,740 Flight 1016 to fall out of the sky, what did? 460 00:26:49,110 --> 00:26:52,160 ♪ ♪ 461 00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:55,120 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Can you bring up the FDR? 462 00:26:55,120 --> 00:26:57,750 NARRATOR: Evidence recovered from US Air 1016's 463 00:26:57,750 --> 00:27:01,960 flight data recorder is now ready to be examined. 464 00:27:01,960 --> 00:27:05,050 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So what have we got? 465 00:27:05,050 --> 00:27:07,210 NARRATOR: The device captures critical indicators 466 00:27:07,210 --> 00:27:09,010 such as airspeed, altitude 467 00:27:09,010 --> 00:27:13,050 and the position of key flight controls. 468 00:27:13,050 --> 00:27:15,060 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Can you blow this up? 469 00:27:15,060 --> 00:27:18,270 NARRATOR: Almost immediately, they come across something puzzling. 470 00:27:18,270 --> 00:27:20,230 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that. 471 00:27:20,230 --> 00:27:23,020 NARRATOR: The data shows that seconds before impact, 472 00:27:23,020 --> 00:27:28,240 the airspeed inexplicably begins to fluctuate. 473 00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:33,870 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The airspeed's all over the place. 474 00:27:33,870 --> 00:27:37,540 FO. HAYES: Ugh. That's 10 knots right there. 475 00:27:37,540 --> 00:27:40,250 NARRATOR: First, it falls by ten knots. 476 00:27:40,250 --> 00:27:41,580 FO. HAYES: Whoa. 477 00:27:41,580 --> 00:27:44,130 NARRATOR: Then it increases by thirty knots. 478 00:27:44,130 --> 00:27:45,880 CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay. You're plus 20. 479 00:27:45,880 --> 00:27:48,090 JOHN: You could see the change on the airplane 480 00:27:48,090 --> 00:27:51,010 because the airspeed started jumping. 481 00:27:51,010 --> 00:27:53,090 NARRATOR: Airspeed is the speed on an aircraft 482 00:27:53,090 --> 00:27:56,140 relative to the air it's flying through. 483 00:27:56,140 --> 00:27:58,890 If the plane encounters a tailwind, airspeed drops 484 00:27:58,890 --> 00:28:04,060 because the rate of airflow over the wings decreases. 485 00:28:04,060 --> 00:28:07,150 A headwind has the opposite effect, increasing airspeed 486 00:28:07,150 --> 00:28:10,570 by accelerating the airflow over the wings. 487 00:28:10,570 --> 00:28:13,110 GREG: What happens is you have a performance increase 488 00:28:13,110 --> 00:28:16,370 because you're flying into a headwind. 489 00:28:16,370 --> 00:28:18,450 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Maybe the wind brought this plane down. 490 00:28:18,450 --> 00:28:21,080 NARRATOR: Could strong winds be the culprit? 491 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:22,410 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Where's that airport map? 492 00:28:22,410 --> 00:28:24,290 To answer that question, investigators will need 493 00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:29,590 precise wind data from the time of the crash. 494 00:28:29,590 --> 00:28:32,170 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Yeah, thank you. 495 00:28:32,170 --> 00:28:34,340 NARRATOR: Like dozens of other US airports... 496 00:28:34,340 --> 00:28:35,340 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: One here. 497 00:28:35,340 --> 00:28:36,390 NARRATOR: ... Charlotte Airport is equipped 498 00:28:36,390 --> 00:28:39,180 with a system of special wind sensors. 499 00:28:39,180 --> 00:28:49,690 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: One here. One here. Here. Here. And here. Six in total. 500 00:28:49,690 --> 00:28:52,190 JOHN: The low level wind shear alert system is a number 501 00:28:52,190 --> 00:28:56,410 of anemometers, wind speed and direction sensors, that 502 00:28:56,410 --> 00:29:00,200 are placed in various places around and near the airport. 503 00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:04,370 And they compare the winds at one part of the airport 504 00:29:04,370 --> 00:29:06,330 with winds at another part. 505 00:29:06,330 --> 00:29:08,340 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. Run it. 506 00:29:08,340 --> 00:29:10,130 NARRATOR: Investigators hope the combined data 507 00:29:10,130 --> 00:29:13,130 from all six sensors at Charlotte Airport will tell them 508 00:29:13,130 --> 00:29:17,510 just how dangerous the winds were on the day of the crash. 509 00:29:17,510 --> 00:29:22,270 JOHN: There was light wind which was not at all severe. 510 00:29:22,270 --> 00:29:23,810 NARRATOR: They discover that top wind speeds 511 00:29:23,810 --> 00:29:25,520 were not very high that day. 512 00:29:25,520 --> 00:29:29,270 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Wait a second. Look at that wind. 513 00:29:29,270 --> 00:29:31,360 It's blowing all over the place. 514 00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:34,700 NARRATOR: But the changes in wind speed and direction were extreme. 515 00:29:34,700 --> 00:29:37,320 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that. 516 00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:39,370 NARRATOR: Less than two minutes before the accident, 517 00:29:39,370 --> 00:29:42,200 four of the six sensors signaled a weather event 518 00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:47,420 known as wind shear. 519 00:29:47,420 --> 00:29:51,210 Wind shear is a sudden shift in wind direction and velocity 520 00:29:51,210 --> 00:29:52,750 that can cause a plane's airspeed 521 00:29:52,750 --> 00:29:56,510 to become dangerously erratic. 522 00:29:56,510 --> 00:30:00,180 FRED: What makes the wind shear events near the airports 523 00:30:00,180 --> 00:30:02,260 at low levels very hazardous is 524 00:30:02,260 --> 00:30:05,770 because the aircraft coming in for landing 525 00:30:05,770 --> 00:30:10,610 have very low airspeeds and are close to the ground. 526 00:30:10,610 --> 00:30:13,360 So there's not much room for managing 527 00:30:13,360 --> 00:30:16,740 the energy state of the aircraft. 528 00:30:16,740 --> 00:30:20,320 NARRATOR: Investigators may finally be close to a breakthrough. 529 00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:23,830 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's get this data to NASA, see what they make of it. 530 00:30:23,830 --> 00:30:25,750 NARRATOR: But they won't know if it was wind shear 531 00:30:25,750 --> 00:30:27,750 that brought down the DC-9 532 00:30:27,750 --> 00:30:32,380 until experts analyze the weather data in detail. 533 00:30:32,380 --> 00:30:35,380 ♪ ♪ 534 00:30:35,380 --> 00:30:38,430 NASA meteorologist Fred Proctor gets the assignment. 535 00:30:38,430 --> 00:30:44,640 ♪ ♪ 536 00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:49,560 FRED: I was asked by the NTSB to help them understand 537 00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:51,310 what happened in this event 538 00:30:51,310 --> 00:30:56,440 and whether or not wind shear was a factor in the accident. 539 00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:59,700 FRED: Okay, let's see what the data tells us. 540 00:30:59,700 --> 00:31:03,660 Adding temperature. Humidity. 541 00:31:03,660 --> 00:31:05,790 NARRATOR: Using a weather simulator, Proctor enters 542 00:31:05,790 --> 00:31:11,290 the airport wind data, along with other key variables. 543 00:31:11,290 --> 00:31:15,000 FRED: I used a model that I had developed earlier 544 00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:17,800 and used in wind shear studies 545 00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:23,550 to recreate the thunderstorm that occurred on that day. 546 00:31:23,550 --> 00:31:28,980 FRED: That should be it. Let's check out this simulation. 547 00:31:28,980 --> 00:31:32,020 FRED: And so from there I began to piece together 548 00:31:32,020 --> 00:31:35,940 or reconstruct the accident event. 549 00:31:35,940 --> 00:31:38,490 NARRATOR: The simulation renders the forces within the storm 550 00:31:38,490 --> 00:31:40,070 in precise detail. 551 00:31:40,070 --> 00:31:41,740 FRED: That's incredible. 552 00:31:41,740 --> 00:31:44,320 NARRATOR: Proctor makes a startling discovery. 553 00:31:44,320 --> 00:31:47,490 The DC-9 didn't just encounter wind shear. 554 00:31:47,490 --> 00:31:50,040 It flew into something even more deadly. 555 00:31:50,790 --> 00:31:52,330 ♪ ♪ 556 00:31:52,330 --> 00:31:56,000 NARRATOR: NASA meteorologist Fred Proctor now has the complete picture 557 00:31:56,000 --> 00:32:01,170 of the violent weather event that blindsided US Air 1016. 558 00:32:01,170 --> 00:32:04,340 FRED: That's no wind shear. That's a microburst. 559 00:32:04,640 --> 00:32:07,850 FRED: A microburst is a strong low-level downdraft 560 00:32:07,850 --> 00:32:10,480 that spreads out at the ground 561 00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:13,690 and creates strong low level wind shear. 562 00:32:13,690 --> 00:32:15,980 NARRATOR: The microburst downdraft hits the ground 563 00:32:15,980 --> 00:32:19,190 with tremendous force, spreading out in all directions 564 00:32:19,190 --> 00:32:21,740 and creating wind shear. 565 00:32:21,740 --> 00:32:25,910 JOHN: You can think of it as suspending a cold block of air 566 00:32:25,910 --> 00:32:29,790 like an anvil and then pulling that support out from under it. 567 00:32:29,790 --> 00:32:33,500 When it starts down it has enormous force. 568 00:32:33,500 --> 00:32:36,040 FRED: When you hit the shear it's like you're coming to 569 00:32:36,040 --> 00:32:37,920 the top of a roller coaster. 570 00:32:39,500 --> 00:32:43,510 And then it's like the bottom drops out. 571 00:32:43,510 --> 00:32:46,220 NARRATOR: It has long been known that these powerful downdrafts 572 00:32:46,220 --> 00:32:50,100 can be lethal for aircraft during takeoff or landing. 573 00:32:50,100 --> 00:32:54,100 GREG: There were a number of accidents in the '60s and in the '70s 574 00:32:54,100 --> 00:32:56,520 that were attributed to a microburst 575 00:32:56,520 --> 00:32:58,520 or wind-shear type environment. 576 00:32:58,520 --> 00:33:00,610 We just didn't know what to call it then. 577 00:33:00,610 --> 00:33:02,190 We hadn't had a lot of information. 578 00:33:02,190 --> 00:33:03,820 Nobody really studied it. 579 00:33:03,820 --> 00:33:06,110 ♪ ♪ 580 00:33:06,110 --> 00:33:09,240 NARRATOR: In 1985, a microburst caused the crash 581 00:33:09,240 --> 00:33:15,210 of Delta Airlines Flight 191 at Dallas/Fort Worth. 582 00:33:15,210 --> 00:33:17,210 One hundred and thirty-five people died, 583 00:33:17,210 --> 00:33:22,590 spurring a major effort to find ways to reduce the threat. 584 00:33:22,590 --> 00:33:27,220 JOHN: Following Delta 191, NASA and a number of people 585 00:33:27,220 --> 00:33:30,470 within the industry started to study thunderstorms 586 00:33:30,470 --> 00:33:34,520 and this microburst, and they found that the microbursts were 587 00:33:34,520 --> 00:33:39,730 far more prevalent and numerous than previously thought. 588 00:33:39,730 --> 00:33:42,190 NARRATOR: The NASA simulation not only confirms that 589 00:33:42,190 --> 00:33:46,110 the DC-9 was hit by a microburst, it reveals that 590 00:33:46,110 --> 00:33:49,700 it was one of the most powerful researchers have ever seen. 591 00:33:49,700 --> 00:33:53,830 FRED: This wind shear event would have been in the top 1% 592 00:33:53,830 --> 00:33:57,580 of most intense microbursts that we had looked at. 593 00:33:57,580 --> 00:34:00,750 I've only seen maybe one or two cases 594 00:34:00,750 --> 00:34:06,590 where microburst wind shear was actually stronger. 595 00:34:06,590 --> 00:34:08,390 NARRATOR: Investigators now know that it was 596 00:34:08,390 --> 00:34:12,400 an extreme microburst that brought down Flight 1016. 597 00:34:14,320 --> 00:34:18,650 But their questioning doesn't end there. 598 00:34:20,900 --> 00:34:22,820 CAPT. GREENLEE: Firewall power! 599 00:34:22,820 --> 00:34:24,360 NARRATOR: They also know that pilots are trained 600 00:34:24,360 --> 00:34:27,490 to deal with such events. 601 00:34:27,490 --> 00:34:30,820 JOHN: If you do find yourself in a microburst, what do you do? 602 00:34:30,820 --> 00:34:35,020 Max power. Get as much lift out of the wings as you can. 603 00:34:35,020 --> 00:34:37,150 Try to keep it flying because 604 00:34:37,150 --> 00:34:39,570 you'll be through it fairly quickly. 605 00:34:39,570 --> 00:34:41,950 NARRATOR: Why weren't the pilots of Flight 1016 606 00:34:41,950 --> 00:34:46,790 able to recover and avoid disaster? 607 00:34:46,790 --> 00:34:50,370 The NTSB gathers pilot training materials from US Air 608 00:34:50,370 --> 00:34:53,540 in the hope of answering that question. 609 00:34:53,540 --> 00:34:56,880 GREG: Those pilots had been trained in the simulator 610 00:34:56,880 --> 00:34:59,550 to a variety of different types of scenarios 611 00:34:59,550 --> 00:35:03,050 that were based on accidents and incidents in the past. 612 00:35:04,390 --> 00:35:07,720 BARRY: And at this point crews had been trained. 613 00:35:07,720 --> 00:35:10,180 In the event that they encounter a microburst they 614 00:35:10,180 --> 00:35:14,350 were trained to traverse them safely and get out of there. 615 00:35:14,350 --> 00:35:17,480 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that US Air trains its pilots 616 00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:22,030 to do two things in the event of a microburst: 617 00:35:22,030 --> 00:35:28,160 apply firewall power and raise the nose into a climb. 618 00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:30,200 GREG: If you're gonna do this wind shear environment 619 00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:34,830 escape maneuver, you go full power and nose up. 620 00:35:34,830 --> 00:35:38,170 You get maximum performance to fly through this environment. 621 00:35:38,170 --> 00:35:42,880 NARRATOR: But did the pilots even know there was a risk of wind shear? 622 00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:46,510 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: We need to know what was going on in that cockpit. 623 00:35:46,510 --> 00:35:50,310 Ready? Okay, let's hear it. 624 00:35:50,310 --> 00:35:52,850 CAPT. GREENLEE: Ladies and gentlemen, we're 40 miles from Charlotte. 625 00:35:52,850 --> 00:35:55,350 NARRATOR: Flight 1016's cockpit voice recording 626 00:35:55,350 --> 00:35:59,190 is the investigators' best hope of finding an answer. 627 00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:01,570 FO. HAYES: There's more rain out there than I thought there was. 628 00:36:01,570 --> 00:36:03,780 CAPT. GREENLEE: It looks like it's hitting just off the edge of the airport. 629 00:36:03,780 --> 00:36:05,360 NARRATOR: The recording reveals that the crew 630 00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:08,990 saw the storm forming over the airport. 631 00:36:08,990 --> 00:36:11,580 The pilots were confident they could handle it. 632 00:36:11,580 --> 00:36:12,790 CAPT. GREENLEE: If we have to bail out, 633 00:36:12,790 --> 00:36:15,420 it looks like we'll bail out to the right. 634 00:36:15,420 --> 00:36:16,580 FO. HAYES: Amen. 635 00:36:16,580 --> 00:36:20,460 CAPT. GREENLEE: So I think we should be all right. 636 00:36:20,460 --> 00:36:22,880 Chance of shear. Heads up. 637 00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:24,510 FO. HAYES: Roger that. 638 00:36:24,510 --> 00:36:27,430 NARRATOR: Captain Greenlee not only knew wind shear was possible, 639 00:36:27,430 --> 00:36:30,310 he was ready with a plan of action. 640 00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:34,310 BARRY: And they were fully prepared to abort the landing, 641 00:36:34,310 --> 00:36:36,400 perform what's called a missed approach 642 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,690 should the weather deteriorate at any point 643 00:36:38,690 --> 00:36:41,940 before they touch down. 644 00:36:41,940 --> 00:36:45,150 NARRATOR: Investigators also discover that when the microburst hit, 645 00:36:45,150 --> 00:36:47,800 the pilots initially did the right thing. 646 00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,090 CAPT. GREENLEE: Max power. FO. HAYES: Max power. 647 00:36:51,090 --> 00:36:53,550 JOHN: They initiated a normal missed approach 648 00:36:53,550 --> 00:36:57,300 and started to accelerate, pitched the nose up, increased 649 00:36:57,300 --> 00:37:01,720 the power on the engines, a normal routine go-around. 650 00:37:01,720 --> 00:37:02,890 CAPT. GREENLEE: Max power. 651 00:37:02,890 --> 00:37:04,770 NARRATOR: But as they continue listening, 652 00:37:04,770 --> 00:37:07,520 they hear something completely unexpected. 653 00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:10,020 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down! 654 00:37:10,020 --> 00:37:15,860 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Wait, stop the tape. Does he just say, push it down? 655 00:37:15,860 --> 00:37:17,950 Play it again. 656 00:37:17,950 --> 00:37:20,910 GREG: When we heard the captain say down, push it down, 657 00:37:20,910 --> 00:37:24,660 we replayed that statement a dozen times 658 00:37:24,660 --> 00:37:29,130 trying to put it in context as to, did he really say that, 659 00:37:29,130 --> 00:37:33,130 and what did he mean by that? 660 00:37:33,130 --> 00:37:35,300 ROBERT: Flaps to 15. 661 00:37:35,300 --> 00:37:38,680 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down. Push it down. 662 00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:40,850 NARRATOR: Based on their training, they should keep 663 00:37:40,850 --> 00:37:43,020 the plane's nose up to climb. 664 00:37:43,020 --> 00:37:46,520 But the captain tells his first officer to drop the nose. 665 00:37:47,940 --> 00:37:51,070 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down. 666 00:37:51,070 --> 00:37:52,940 BARRY: We were all surprised when that came out. 667 00:37:52,940 --> 00:37:54,530 None of us were expecting that. 668 00:37:54,530 --> 00:37:58,530 It goes against what pilots are supposed to do 669 00:37:58,530 --> 00:38:01,660 in a wind shear escape maneuver. 670 00:38:01,660 --> 00:38:03,540 GWPS: Terrain. Terrain. 671 00:38:03,540 --> 00:38:05,040 GREG: If he didn't push the nose over, 672 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:06,870 they wouldn't have flown into the ground. 673 00:38:06,870 --> 00:38:10,420 GWPS: Terrain. Terrain. Terrain. 674 00:38:10,420 --> 00:38:12,800 CAPT. GREENLEE: Ugh. Firewall power! 675 00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:15,960 GWPS: Terrain. Terrain. 676 00:38:15,960 --> 00:38:20,550 ♪ ♪ 677 00:38:20,550 --> 00:38:22,550 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: What was he thinking? 678 00:38:24,010 --> 00:38:26,560 ♪ ♪ 679 00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:29,020 NARRATOR: Investigators return to the US Air pilots, 680 00:38:29,020 --> 00:38:31,980 hoping to learn why they didn't keep the plane's nose up 681 00:38:31,980 --> 00:38:33,690 as they were trained to do. 682 00:38:33,690 --> 00:38:35,900 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Hey. Good to see you. 683 00:38:35,900 --> 00:38:37,690 Listen, I need your help with one thing 684 00:38:37,690 --> 00:38:39,110 I just can't understand. 685 00:38:39,110 --> 00:38:42,950 Why did the captain decide to push the nose down? 686 00:38:42,950 --> 00:38:46,620 FO. HAYES: I, I don't really remember. 687 00:38:46,620 --> 00:38:51,790 FO. HAYES: I'm not sure if I have a clear recollection of that, 688 00:38:51,790 --> 00:38:54,800 of him saying that or if it was, 689 00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:56,210 or if I just remember listening to it 690 00:38:56,210 --> 00:38:58,050 on the cockpit voice recorder. 691 00:38:58,050 --> 00:39:01,720 All I remember is that we were losing airspeed. 692 00:39:01,720 --> 00:39:03,010 We could have stalled. 693 00:39:03,010 --> 00:39:04,640 BARRY: They were re-interviewed about that, 694 00:39:04,640 --> 00:39:06,010 why the captain called for that. 695 00:39:06,010 --> 00:39:08,230 And I don't believe that we got an answer, 696 00:39:08,230 --> 00:39:12,190 though that explained it. 697 00:39:12,190 --> 00:39:13,980 GREG: And when we showed them the data, 698 00:39:13,980 --> 00:39:16,150 and we let the captain and the first officer 699 00:39:16,150 --> 00:39:19,070 listen to the cockpit voice recorder. 700 00:39:19,070 --> 00:39:23,280 It's like, that's you. Why'd you say that? Don't know. 701 00:39:23,280 --> 00:39:25,910 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. Well thanks again. 702 00:39:25,910 --> 00:39:29,000 JOHN: Trying to get precise information from them 703 00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:32,210 in an interview proved to be pretty hard, 704 00:39:32,210 --> 00:39:33,830 not because they were withholding anything; 705 00:39:33,830 --> 00:39:37,750 just because humans don't always remember great detail 706 00:39:37,750 --> 00:39:40,220 under high-stress events. 707 00:39:40,220 --> 00:39:42,800 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Next slide, please. 708 00:39:42,800 --> 00:39:44,600 NARRATOR: Investigators can only speculate 709 00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,140 about why the captain reacted as he did. 710 00:39:47,140 --> 00:39:48,220 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: And the next slide, please. 711 00:39:48,220 --> 00:39:50,020 NARRATOR: It suggests he fell into the grip 712 00:39:50,020 --> 00:39:52,270 of a deadly phenomenon that aviators call 713 00:39:52,270 --> 00:39:56,020 spatial disorientation. 714 00:39:56,020 --> 00:39:58,940 GREG: How we maintain our orientation in space 715 00:39:58,940 --> 00:40:03,820 is with our feet on the ground, basically the force of gravity, 716 00:40:03,820 --> 00:40:07,120 and the fluid in our inner ear and primarily our eyes. 717 00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:10,080 So when you look out at the horizon you know what is up, 718 00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:11,080 what is down. 719 00:40:11,080 --> 00:40:12,620 FO. HAYES: Whoa. 720 00:40:12,620 --> 00:40:14,670 CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay, you're plus 20. Take it around. 721 00:40:14,670 --> 00:40:20,130 Go to the right. US Air 1016's on the go. 722 00:40:20,130 --> 00:40:22,970 NARRATOR: In flight, extreme changes in speed, 723 00:40:22,970 --> 00:40:26,680 direction and altitude create physical forces on the body 724 00:40:26,680 --> 00:40:29,060 that can confuse the senses. 725 00:40:29,060 --> 00:40:30,640 This may cause the pilot to lose track 726 00:40:30,640 --> 00:40:33,890 of the plane's orientation. 727 00:40:33,890 --> 00:40:36,270 GREG: What happens with pilots is that 728 00:40:36,270 --> 00:40:39,650 during the course of acceleration and deceleration 729 00:40:39,650 --> 00:40:42,240 the fluid in their inner ear starts to move. 730 00:40:42,240 --> 00:40:44,240 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down! 731 00:40:44,240 --> 00:40:46,280 GREG: And so your body will fool you, 732 00:40:46,280 --> 00:40:52,290 because all you have is basically the body sensation. 733 00:40:52,290 --> 00:40:54,080 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: He's coming in for his landing 734 00:40:54,080 --> 00:40:55,790 and he gets hit by the thunderstorm. 735 00:40:55,790 --> 00:40:58,340 So he decides to do a missed approach. 736 00:40:58,340 --> 00:41:00,210 But just as they're climbing, 737 00:41:00,210 --> 00:41:03,970 the microburst pushes the plane down. It slows the airspeed. 738 00:41:03,970 --> 00:41:06,760 Now the captain believes that the plane is 739 00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:10,390 about to stall and that they're pointed up. 740 00:41:10,390 --> 00:41:12,180 JOHN: And a stall that close to the ground 741 00:41:12,180 --> 00:41:14,020 would have been catastrophic. 742 00:41:14,020 --> 00:41:18,770 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: But in reality they're nearly level. 743 00:41:18,770 --> 00:41:24,320 So he tells the first officer to push the plane down. 744 00:41:24,320 --> 00:41:29,410 CAPT. GREENLEE: Down! Push it down! 745 00:41:29,410 --> 00:41:31,120 NARRATOR: For Captain Greenlee... 746 00:41:31,120 --> 00:41:32,870 CAPT. GREENLEE: Firewall power! 747 00:41:32,870 --> 00:41:34,500 NARRATOR: ... it would have felt like the DC-9 748 00:41:34,500 --> 00:41:37,370 was in a dangerously steep climb, 749 00:41:37,370 --> 00:41:40,960 a false sensation called somatogravic illusion. 750 00:41:40,960 --> 00:41:42,340 GREG: The somatogravic illusion 751 00:41:42,340 --> 00:41:47,380 is a very disconcerting illusion because 752 00:41:47,380 --> 00:41:50,010 your body sensations can trick you. 753 00:41:50,010 --> 00:41:51,890 He thought, we're pitching too fast, 754 00:41:51,890 --> 00:41:55,810 when in fact it was perfect. 755 00:41:55,810 --> 00:41:57,810 JOHN: Had they been able to just sustain the flight for 756 00:41:57,810 --> 00:42:06,190 another thirty seconds, they'd have been out the backside. 757 00:42:06,190 --> 00:42:08,490 NARRATOR: In their final report, investigators highlight 758 00:42:08,490 --> 00:42:10,910 the need for prompt weather updates 759 00:42:10,910 --> 00:42:14,490 whenever there's a risk of thunderstorms. 760 00:42:14,490 --> 00:42:17,500 They also call on the FAA to make sure that 761 00:42:17,500 --> 00:42:19,920 controllers are displaying the highest level 762 00:42:19,920 --> 00:42:23,090 of precipitation intensity on their radar screens 763 00:42:23,090 --> 00:42:28,260 and relaying that information to flight crews. 764 00:42:28,260 --> 00:42:31,220 Finally, since the Flight 1016 tragedy, 765 00:42:31,220 --> 00:42:35,060 a more sophisticated type of radar called Doppler radar 766 00:42:35,060 --> 00:42:37,390 has become standard equipment at most airports 767 00:42:37,390 --> 00:42:40,440 and on board many aircraft. 768 00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:43,070 GREG: You can see the intensities of the wind, 769 00:42:43,070 --> 00:42:45,320 the vertical and the horizontal velocities. 770 00:42:45,320 --> 00:42:47,530 That's great information. 771 00:42:47,530 --> 00:42:50,160 JOHN: They have predictive wind shear, and so it can 772 00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:54,410 actually look and predict before the airplane arrives 773 00:42:54,410 --> 00:42:58,250 so that you get a much earlier warning. 774 00:42:58,250 --> 00:43:02,580 FRED: Because of our increased understanding of wind shear 775 00:43:02,580 --> 00:43:07,300 and the development of new technologies, there has not been 776 00:43:07,300 --> 00:43:11,760 a case in the United States of a wind shear accident 777 00:43:11,760 --> 00:43:17,180 since the Charlotte event. 778 00:43:17,180 --> 00:43:19,350 NARRATOR: Both Mike Greenlee and Phil Hayes 779 00:43:19,350 --> 00:43:22,480 resumed their flying careers, eventually becoming pilots 780 00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:23,690 for American Airlines 781 00:43:23,690 --> 00:43:27,570 when American merged with US Airways in 2013. 782 00:43:27,570 --> 00:43:30,320 As for flight attendant Richard DeMary, 783 00:43:30,320 --> 00:43:32,660 his brave actions in the immediate aftermath 784 00:43:32,660 --> 00:43:37,330 of the Flight 1016 crash earned him no fewer than five awards, 785 00:43:37,330 --> 00:43:39,660 including the US Department of Transportation's 786 00:43:39,660 --> 00:43:42,540 Award for Heroism. 787 00:43:42,540 --> 00:43:44,750 RICHARD: I believe that while I was 788 00:43:44,750 --> 00:43:49,550 the individual in the event, the awards really represent 789 00:43:49,550 --> 00:43:52,590 a recognition of the flight attendant profession, 790 00:43:52,590 --> 00:43:56,510 and that flight attendants play a role of extreme importance 791 00:43:56,510 --> 00:43:58,640 on each and every flight.